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The Committee for Economic Development is an 
independent research and policy organization of over 
200 business leaders and educators. CED is non-profit, 
non-partisan, and non-political. Its purpose is to pro-
pose policies that bring about steady economic growth 
at high employment and reasonably stable prices, 
increased productivity and living standards, greater 
and more equal opportunity for every citizen, and an 
improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must have the 
approval of trustees on the Research and Policy 
Committee. This committee is directed under the by-
laws, which emphasize that “all research is to be thor-
oughly objective in character, and the approach in each 
instance is to be from the standpoint of the general 
welfare and not from that of any special political or 
economic group.” The committee is aided by a Research 
Advisory Board of leading social scientists and by a 
small permanent professional staff.
The Research and Policy Committee does not attempt 
to pass judgment on any pending specific legislative 
proposals; its purpose is to urge careful consideration 
of the objectives set forth in this statement and of the 
best means of accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive discussions, 
meetings, and exchange of memoranda. The research 
is undertaken by a subcommittee, assisted by advisors 
chosen for their competence in the field under study. 
The full Research and Policy Committee participates in 
the drafting of recommendations. Likewise, the trust-
ees on the drafting subcommittee vote to approve or 
disapprove a policy statement, and they share with the 
Research and Policy Committee the privilege of sub-
mitting individual comments for publication.
The recommendations presented herein are those of the 
trustee members of the Research and Policy Committee 
and the responsible subcommittee. They are not necessarily 
endorsed by other trustees or by non-trustee subcommittee 
members, advisors, contributors, staff members, or others 
associated with CED.
Responsibility For CED Statements On National Policy
ix
The committed and knowledgeable group of busi-
ness, academic, and policy leaders listed on pages vi 
and vii including CED Trustees and invited guests, 
began meeting in mid-2006 to consider U.S. corporate 
performance.  They quickly homed in on the often-ob-
served and lamented, but never remedied, phenomenon 
of  “short-termism”—the focus of corporate executives, 
and financial markets generally, on quarterly reported 
results to the near exclusion of enduring value.  The 
initial deliberations sought to be broad in scope—to 
examine the entire financial landscape and the incen-
tives of executives, shareholders, equity analysts, and 
others—because the causes and consequences of 
short-term thinking are present throughout financial 
markets, and the linkages among the various market 
participants seem to call for a comprehensive solution.  
The subcommittee came to focus on the role directors 
can play in changing the culture and practices of cor-
porations.  Directors are uniquely positioned to make 
a difference.  In addition, the composition, experience 
and expertise of CED’s membership enable them to 
contribute to a discussion about directors’ roles.  As the 
link between shareholders and management, directors 
can emphasize the importance of long-term perfor-
mance; their leadership can help to create corporations 
that are built to last.  
We are under no illusion that directors by themselves 
can solve all problems of short-termism.  Surely, share-
holders and managers of pooled assets, such as hedge 
funds, mutual funds, and pension funds need to be part 
of the solution.  Nor do we think that one size will fit 
all; the marketplace is diverse, and each company faces 
its own specific circumstances.  Still, though short-term 
considerations are often unavoidable, the growth of 
hedge funds and other pooled assets, among other fac-
tors, is stepping up pressure on companies to set aside 
long-term objectives to achieve measures of short-term 
performance.  We are convinced, therefore, that indi-
vidual corporations, and the U.S. economy as a whole, 
need an increased and continuing focus on enduring, 
long-term performance.  This statement was written to 
encourage and help attain that necessary focus.
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Purpose of This Statement

Key Points
Decision making based primarily on short-term 
considerations damages the ability of public compa-
nies—and, therefore, of the U.S. economy—to sustain 
superior long-term performance. 
Emphasis on quarterly earnings, compensation tied 
to earnings per share, shortened CEO tenures, and 
financial reports that fail adequately to inform about 
company performance impede the task of building 
long-term value. These phenomena are commonly 
known as “short-termism,” and we believe that it is the 
responsibility of corporate boards to use their power 
either to eliminate these practices or to counteract their 
effect.
We call on boards of directors to address these 
problems by putting the long-term interests of the 
corporate entity at the forefront of their concerns 
and demonstrating through their actions that those 
concerns trump interest in short-term price move-
ments.  
Specifically, directors can:
• Support management’s development of compre-
hensive strategic plans with appropriate long-term 
objectives, and continually assess management’s 
performance vis-à-vis those objectives and interim 
milestones.  
• Structure incentive compensation plans so that a 
significant portion of the income of the CEO and 
other top executives is tied to the achievement of 
well articulated long-term performance objectives 
in line with the corporate strategy.  
• Insist that corporate reporting be redesigned to 
include useful non-financial indicators of value, 
such as those proposed by the Enhanced Business 
Reporting Consortium, and that such measures 
count internally for assessment of performance.  
Built to Last: 
Focusing Corporations on Long-Term Performance
Executive Summary
• Eliminate quarterly guidance on earnings per share. 
Such guidance encourages a focus on (and some-
times a distortion of ) short-term financial results 
and attracts short-term, speculative trading rather 
than long-term investing.
• Promote succession plans that emphasize growth 
of internal managerial talent.  Doing so would help 
diminish reliance on costly contracts for recruited 
executives and may counter the pressure to achieve 
short-term performance.
Overview
Corporate performance in the past decade has been, in 
various important respects, disappointing, even though 
U.S. corporate profits recently have been unusually 
high.  Our main concern is that “short-termism”—an 
excessive focus on a company’s quarterly reported 
financial results rather than on more fundamental 
drivers of growth and enduring value—is in fact un-
dercutting the economic performance of some U.S.-
based corporations and, therefore, of the overall U.S. 
economy.    
By all accounts, the prominent shortfalls of ethical 
performance associated with Enron, WorldCom, and 
other companies that lost their way in the last decade 
was at least partly caused by pressure their managers 
felt to meet the financial market’s quarterly earnings 
expectations.  Shareholders in those companies suf-
fered direct losses, and the ensuing general loss of trust 
in American corporations imposed additional costs on 
all.  Since 2002, companies and regulators have sought 
to restore investors’ trust, a topic CED addressed in a 
2006 statement, Private Enterprise, Public Trust: The 
State of Corporate America After Sarbanes-Oxley.  The 
focus on repairing the damage of the Enron era is nec-
essary.  It should not, however, distract business from 
the need also to focus on economic performance in a 
changing and competitive world.
The overemphasis on short-term considerations 
imposes high costs on shareholders and the broader 
economy.  In corporations, these costs are manifest 
in: the practice of deferring investments and liquidat-
ing assets to enhance reported quarterly earnings per 
share, regardless of the effect on future profitability; the 
shortened tenure of corporate CEOs; excessive pay-
ments to corporate executives for meeting near-term 
and low-aspirational targets; large signing bonuses 
paid to incoming CEOs; and similarly generous sever-
ance and retirement benefits paid to departing CEOs.  
Financial markets lend their own short-term orienta-
tion through frequent trading of shares by asset man-
agers, the consequent shorter holding periods of asset 
funds, and the pressures market traders and speculators 
bring to bear on corporate managers to produce short-
term results.  These practices reduce investors’ returns 
over the long haul.
We recognize that the flexibility and adaptability of 
the U.S. economy are central to its long-term success. 
Some forms of short-term behavior, however, are not 
hallmarks of flexibility and prosperity, but impediments 
to real change and paths to long-term decline.  Behavior 
that is focused on maximization of short-term reported 
results, rather than on investment, research, training, 
and other value-enhancing activities, is harmful to 
long-term performance. 
As a general rule, we look to boards of directors as the 
first line of defense to protect shareholders’ interests.  
Directors provide the link between shareholders and 
corporate managers.  Nonetheless, the multiplicity of 
shareholders with different interests can sometimes 
leave a director uncertain about his or her fiduciary 
duty.  We therefore stress that the best course is to 
act in the long-term interests of the corporate entity.  
Doing so should raise the expected value of future 
returns and, hence, the current share price as well.  If 
long-term investors are being short-changed by manag-
ers’ overemphasis of short-term considerations, then all 
shares are effectively priced below potential value and 
all shareholders are losing.  In our view, it is up to direc-
tors to push managers back toward a longer-term (at 
least three to five years) view.  
Although fixation on the short term is widely spread 
throughout business and finance, we focus our atten-
tion and recommendations on corporate directors.  
directors are the fiduciaries of shareholders’ inter-
ests and have a responsibility to counter the growth 
of  “short-termism” by encouraging corporations 
to realign executive incentive compensation plans 
and other practices for long-term performance, to 
develop better and more transparent reporting of a 
company’s performance and long-term intent, and to 
end the practice of quarterly earnings guidance.  
Employing Corporate Governance to 
Promote Growth
“Corporate governance” encompasses a broad array of 
activities, goals, and relationships designed to serve 
shareholders’ interests.  Those interests are best served 
by directors who not only act as watchdogs but also use 
their positions to motivate management to pay greater 
attention to long-term performance.  Earlier legal and 
market-based changes in corporate governance, some 
of which are still working their way into practice, have 
built the foundation for directors to play a stronger role 
in driving long-term performance issues.      
Directors can promote long-term value creation by:
• supporting the development of strategic plans 
with sound long-term objectives; 
• linking executive compensation more closely to 
long-term performance; and
• promoting succession planning and addressing 
shortened ceo tenures. 
Supporting Strategic Plans with Long-Term 
Objectives 
acting in the shareholders’ interests, the board 
should constructively engage with management to 
promote the development of long-term strategies.  
such engagement should avoid the pitfall of micro-
management; rather, it should focus on the process 
of reviewing, appraising, and enriching manage-
ment’s plan, and on holding management account-
able for its continuing evolution and execution.  To 
be clear, we are not suggesting that boards usurp man-
agement functions by formulating independent strate-
gies.  Our recommendation is that directors exercise 
their duty to ensure that management has a long-term 
implementation plan for a strategy, supported by risk 
assessment, which enhances the enduring value of the 
company.  After reviewing and approving a strategy, the 
board should stay involved by holding management ac-
countable for that strategy and ensuring that oversight 
practices are in place to assess the enterprise-wide risks 
to the company.  Directors should measure executives’ 
performance against strategic goals.    
Linking Executive Compensation to Long-
Term Performance
The board is responsible for aligning the corporation’s 
executive compensation program with its strategic plan. 
The setting of executive compensation incentives is a 
key to achieving strategic goals, since corporate execu-
tives generally will do that for which they are paid.
CED’s 2006 report laid out a framework for reforming 
the system used to determine executive pay in U.S. cor-
porations.  Those recommendations emphasize trans-
parency and accountability on the part of independent 
compensation committees and predominantly inde-
pendent boards of directors.  These key principles are 
embedded in post-Enron reforms and in newly imple-
mented rules for disclosure of executive compensation.  
We expect these reforms to be effective over time and 
are reluctant to recommend additional regulatory mea-
sures before giving recent reforms a chance to work.
The next step is for independent compensation com-
mittees to improve the link between executive com-
pensation and long-term performance.  Performance 
triggers for incentive payments, when used, are often 
tied to short-term financial indicators such as annual 
earnings per share or share-price performance.  Such 
targets encourage executives to adopt too short a time 
horizon and to focus too much on short-term share 
price and accounting measures and not enough on 
long-term strategic development.  
to help create an effective system that links com-
pensation to long-term performance, we recommend 
that directors:
• Be vigilant in constructing pay packages that 
motivate executives to maximize the company’s 
long-term economic value.  For example, compen-
sation committees may want to spell out the long-
term concerns they expect their CEO and other 
executives to address, such as employee retention, 
customer satisfaction, environmental sustainability, 
development of new products or markets, adapt-
ability to changes in public policies, or other indica-
tors of the company’s long-term health.  
• align company executives’ financial interests and 
incentives with the long-term health of the com-
pany and its stock price.  Although specific condi-
tions should dictate a company’s policies, in general 
top executives should be expected to purchase over 
time a substantial number of shares with their own 
money (not just from compensation awards) and 
to hold shares equal to an appropriate multiple of 
base salary.  That is, executives should be required 
to act as “buy and hold” investors. Vesting and exer-
cise periods for equity grants–options or shares—
should be increased beyond existing practice 
and tied to multi-year performance.  for similar 
reasons, directors also should be required to buy 
and hold the company’s shares.*†
 • engage major shareholders in a dialogue about 
executive compensation programs.  Investor 
groups recently have begun to seek advisory votes 
on executive compensation, to allow shareholders 
to express general approval or disapproval of the 
company’s executive compensation plan.  However, 
an advisory vote seems a crude and unnecessary 
instrument for communicating about this complex 
topic.  A simple up-or-down vote could send mixed 
and confusing signals.  More important, we see no 
reason for shareholders to vote only on a company’s 
executive compensation plan among all of the other 
major decisions taken by a board of directors.  
Because the goal of those supporting a vote is to 
open a dialogue about pay issues, we urge compen-
sation committees to initiate the dialogue up front.
Encouraging Succession Planning and 
Addressing Shortened CEO Tenures 
The shortened tenure of today’s CEOs has focused 
those executives on short-term results and on keying 
compensation to such results, to ensure their wealth 
position over an uncertain, but likely short, tenure.  The 
incentive to fund long-lived projects likely declines if 
the return on such investments comes after the end of 
a contract period or likely term of office.  Short ten-
ures also motivate contracts with signing bonuses and 
severance agreements, which have driven up executive 
compensation.*†See Memorandum Page 26
to address these issues, we recommend that direc-
tors: 
• ensure that the company has a strong succession 
plan and grows managerial talent internally.  In 
the past 20 to 30 years, we have seen an evolution 
from CEOs who were nurtured and developed 
within a company, and who usually served at the 
will of the board without a contract, to a greater 
number of CEOs who are hired from outside and, 
for legitimate reasons, are employed by contract.  
Developing internal talent, in addition to providing 
direct benefits to the company, reduces pressure on 
compensation committees to offer incoming CEOs 
exorbitant contracts, complete with up-front sign-
ing bonuses and severance guarantees. 
• consider alternatives to contracts at the ceo 
level.   When contracts are necessary, they 
should be devised carefully to pursue the 
company’s long-term goals over a realistic time 
frame.  As elaborated by the National Association 
of Corporate Directors (NACD) Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Executive Compensation, com-
pensation committees should take care to deter-
mine whether a contract for a CEO is truly neces-
sary.  If the committee decides to use a contract, it 
should understand the potential consequences of 
all contract provisions.  All contracts should have 
reasonable “sunset” provisions.  Neither a resigna-
tion nor a notice of non-renewal for an employ-
ment agreement should automatically give rise to 
severance. 
Develop More Meaningful Indicators of 
Corporate Value
Providers and users of financial information are in-
creasingly vocal in complaining that the current system 
of accounting principles, measurement, and disclosure 
is more complicated and more costly than it should be.  
Investors also contend that the system fails to provide 
as much useful information as it could.  One significant 
problem cited is that “intangibles” (such as the value 
of the company’s brand or its relationships with em-
ployees, suppliers and customers), which often drive 
company performance, are not well measured, or not 
measured at all, under current accounting conventions.  
CED addressed many of these issues in the 2006 state-
ment (which argued that financial reports do not pro-
vide a precise measurement of corporate performance).  
That statement highlighted the inherently judgmental 
character of accounting statements, and recommended 
that financial reports be supplemented with non-fi-
nancial indicators of value.  In this statement, we focus 
on how such business reports could address investors’ 
concerns about a company’s sustainability and future 
profitability. 
An ongoing effort to improve companies’ reporting 
on the sustainability of their performance is being 
undertaken by the Enhanced Business Reporting 
Consortium (EBRC).  The EBRC promotes a volun-
tary framework for the presentation and disclosure of  
“value drivers”—the elements of a company’s business 
that are the sources of its value—and other informa-
tion that many companies use in internal assessments.  
Public disclosure would inform investors about a 
company’s condition and its longer-term prospects.  
Such disclosure may include key quantitative indicators 
of performance or qualitative factors such as busi-
ness opportunities, risks, strategies and plans—which 
would help investors to assess the quality, sustainability 
and variability of the company’s future cash flows and 
earnings. 
Non-financial indicators, consistent with the EBR 
initiative, could be used within a company and in 
public reports without any rule changes, although 
companies may be reluctant to do so without assur-
ance that it would not create additional legal liabilities.  
Public companies have been required to include with 
financial statements a narrative, known since 1980 as 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), 
which is meant to give readers “an opportunity to look 
at the company through the eyes of management by 
providing both a short- and long-term analysis of the 
business of the company.”  Most observers find MD&A 
narratives fall well short of the goal.  Such narratives 
could be improved by following a framework like the 
one proposed by the EBRC.
for their internal assessments of performance, we 
recommend that directors encourage management 
to adopt reporting systems that focus attention on 
“value drivers” and long-term risks, such as those 
proposed by the enhanced Business reporting 
framework.  directors may consider requesting re-
ports on such metrics as part of the information pro-
vided in the board package.  companies also should 
voluntarily provide information derived from those 
systems to complement public financial reports.  
Curb Quarterly Earnings Guidance 
companies should voluntarily refrain from issuing 
short-term guidance.  The false precision of financial 
statements feeds the narrow “earnings-per-share” focus 
of managers, speculative traders, and analysts.  Most 
observers view company forecasts of quarterly changes 
in earning per share, and market reliance on those 
forecasts, as among the primary causes of short-term 
behavior—possibly including aggressive accounting by 
some companies to “make their numbers,”  or postpone-
ment of valuable long-term investments.
At present, about half of listed, public companies in 
the United States issue quarterly guidance on expected 
earnings.  The role of such guidance is to communi-
cate and establish expectations about company per-
formance.  However, research studies indicate that 
quarterly guidance is at best a waste of resources and, 
more likely, a self-fulfilling exercise that attracts short-
term traders.  In addition, the pressure associated with 
quarterly earnings guidance has been cited as one of the 
factors fueling the boom in private equity buyouts.  
In recent years, over 200 companies have discontinued 
earnings guidance, and the percentage of listed compa-
nies offering guidance has fallen.  Companies that drop 
quarterly guidance have one fewer reason to manage 
earnings toward an earnings-per-share target and, thus, 
may be less likely to trade off long-term benefits for the 
appearance of current gains.  
Though it is advisable that firms end quarterly earn-
ings guidance, it does not mean that they should end all 
guidance.  As discussed above, companies should pro-
vide regular guidance on long-term performance and 
sustainability.  Such guidance should focus on company 
strategy, value drivers, and long-term risks. 

Like much of the business community, we are con-
cerned that “short-termism”—a focus on a company’s 
quarterly reported financial results rather than on its 
enduring value—is undercutting the economic perfor-
mance of U.S.-based corporations and, therefore, of 
the U.S. economy overall.  This problem is pervasive 
in America’s executive suites and financial markets.  In 
corporate offices, short-termism can be seen in the 
common practice of managing to meet the quarterly 
earnings expectations of “the Street,” rather than to 
maximize the long-term (three years and beyond) value 
of the corporation.  In financial markets it is evident in 
the frequency and volume of trades executed for quick 
gains, in contrast to traditional buy-and-hold investing 
for long-term growth.  
Our goal is to promote long-term corporate perfor-
mance; it is not “long-termism” or its relatives, com-
placency and inattention.  We do not value entrenched 
interests that have dug in for the long haul and stifled 
productive change.  Rather, building long-term perfor-
mance requires, among other things, that management 
and the board of directors have a strategic understand-
ing of the dynamic factors that drive the corporation’s 
growth, the risks to those factors, and how to respond 
to changes affecting the company’s markets.
We know, of course, that short-term considerations 
often dominate management and board concerns, and 
we sympathize with those who must make difficult 
decisions under uncertain conditions.  Some amount 
of short-term orientation, quarterly profit making, and 
attention to financial indicators is natural, unavoidable, 
and in some cases even desirable.  Directors and man-
agers typically must confront high levels of risk, both 
external and internal to the corporation, which neces-
sarily fosters short-term thinking.  Uncertainty about 
the future of government policies (fiscal, monetary, and 
regulatory), terrorism, and other external factors makes 
it difficult to plan for the long term, and managers 
must work to prosper despite such uncertainty.   Time 
spent by corporate boards and managers on compliance 
issues takes away from time available to discuss long-
term strategy or look over the horizon, but that effort 
too is necessary.  Most important, new information 
entering the marketplace is often a true signal of change 
for the long-term prospects of a company.  The ability 
of corporate leaders to absorb new information about 
markets, technological change, and other economic 
events, make quick decisions to capitalize on such 
information, and manage associated risks is a strength 
of the U.S. economy that should not be underrated or 
lightly discarded.  Ideally, however, decisions that ad-
dress short-term issues should not sacrifice the achieve-
ment of longer-term goals.  
Still, we know from experience that long-term goals 
have been sacrificed on occasion to short-term con-
siderations.  Sometimes those considerations cause 
suboptimal economic choices and lamentable under-
performance, thereby harming the interests of current 
shareholders and other capital market participants.  
Other times the shortfall of performance has come 
from ethical lapses associated with such companies 
as Enron and WorldCom, where short-term financial 
pressures contributed to managers’ bad judgments.  
Shareholders in those companies suffered large direct 
losses, and all market participants suffered from the 
damage to the trust required for smooth functioning 
markets.  As a result, all public corporations have had 
to make governance changes to regain investors’ trust, 
a topic CED addressed in a 2006 statement, Private 
Enterprise, Public Trust: The State of Corporate America 
After Sarbanes-Oxley.  
The focus on repairing the damage of the Enron era 
should not distract business from the need also to focus 
on achieving better long-term economic performance 
for shareholders.  As a general rule, we look to direc-
tors as the first line of defense to protect sharehold-
ers’ interests because they are the link between capital 
markets and corporate managers.  The multiplicity of 
shareholders with differing interests—institutional 
shareholders, short-term speculators, hedge funds, 
Chapter I: 
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investors, and others—has appeared to leave some 
directors uncertain of how to exercise their fiduciary 
responsibilities to represent the interests of all share-
holders.  This report seeks to encourage directors to 
promote the long-term interests of the corporate entity 
rather than indulging speculators who care only about 
short-term changes in the share price.*  Market forces 
should ensure that value-enhancing activities that can 
be expected to yield future benefits will be reflected in 
current share prices, which would satisfy the interests 
of virtually all shareholders.   
The Causes and Consequences  
of Short-Termism
In principle, the economic value of a business (or its as-
sets) is the present value of the net discounted revenue 
stream it produces over time.  But the market value 
of a business at any particular moment is determined 
by the supply of and demand for its stock.  In theory, 
with certain foreknowledge, the two measures of value 
would be the same, but real world uncertainties almost 
guarantee that at any specific moment economic value 
and market value will diverge.  This phenomenon—the 
separation of market value from underlying economic 
value—seems to have become more problematic with 
time.  A constant stream of new information—much of 
it of dubious worth—causes market values to fluctuate, 
as buyers and sellers reevaluate their positions.  With 
the cost of trading securities lower than ever, traders, 
often using automated computer programs, may buy or 
sell based on an evaluation of each new piece of infor-
mation, sometimes overreacting and causing changes in 
a company’s share price independent of changes in the 
company’s true condition.  
Wherever one looks—whether at corporate directors 
and managers, shareholders, pooled-assets managers, 
equity analysts, or regulators—incentives and, con-
sequently, behaviors are biased towards short-term 
results.  Academic research on “short-termism” shows 
how various intertwined factors cause well-intentioned 
market participants to divert attention from building 
for the future to focusing on the opportunities and 
challenges of the present.†  Among these factors are: 
• changes in technology and regulation that have 
reduced the cost of trading securities, thereby 
making prices more responsive to each additional 
disclosure, each business development, and each 
burst of market activity.  That, in turn, sometimes 
causes corporate managers to act with the intent of 
pushing current share prices higher without regard 
to longer-term consequences.1
• activities of hedge funds and other asset managers 
who trade large blocks of equities for short-term 
profits.  Whether through the frequency of trading, 
employing a “short” strategy, or through so-called 
“activism” strategies, these asset managers can 
induce corporate managers to focus on short-term 
tactics at the expense of long-term strategies. ‡ 2
• the growth of private equity funds, which are often 
seen as an antidote to short-termism because they 
operate on a longer time horizon, also can reinforce 
short-term behavior in some situations, including 
when the management of an “undervalued” public 
company feels the pressure for short-term improve-
ment in the company’s share price.
• the structure of executive compensation, which 
causes short-term behavior by tying performance 
pay to the achievement of short-term financial 
targets.3 
• shortened tenures for CEOs (a decrease from 8.9 
years in 1995 to 4.9 years in 2000), which natu-
rally focuses their attention to short-term results.4  
Some evidence indicates that a CEO’s incentive 
to fund long-lived projects declines as he or she 
approaches retirement or the end of a contract 
period.5
* See Memorandum, page 26. 
 
† Theoreticians have mixed opinions about whether short-termism can even exist.  Some hold to an “efficient market hypothesis,” which holds that prices 
of shares are indeed the best estimates of real value due to the efficient pricing of the stock market.  Many others have shown that the violation of certain 
theoretical assumptions, such as the existence of momentum trading, makes short-termism not just possible but likely.   
 
‡ In fairness, recent research indicates that in many cases hedge fund activism has had a positive effect on the performance of a target company’s share price.
• the practice of providing quarterly earnings guid-
ance leads financial actors, both inside and outside 
the corporation, to focus too heavily on reported 
earnings per share. The perceived importance of 
meeting the expected earnings per share number, 
and the penalty imposed by market traders when 
reported earnings fall short, cause company manag-
ers to sacrifice future profits to boost short-term 
earnings. 
Short-term behavior is most troubling when it diverts 
resources from contributing to economic growth.  On 
balance, short-termism redistributes wealth rather than 
creating it.  Although short-term trading and other 
aspects of near-sighted behavior can produce some 
immediate benefits, our own experiences and those of 
other business and investor groups that have consid-
ered this topic indicate that short-termism is overall a 
costly characteristic of today’s financial markets, and 
reflects the behavior of many participants.6  
Resources can be wastefully misallocated in several 
ways.  For example:  
• Corporate managers forgo otherwise profitable 
investments so that they could “hit their numbers,” 
thereby satisfying financial market expectations 
but giving up the opportunity to increase long-
term company value.7  In a survey of chief financial 
officers, approximately 80 percent said they would 
decrease discretionary spending on projects such as 
research to meet short-term earnings targets, and 
more than half said they would delay new projects 
even if it meant a sacrifice in value.8 
• Corporate managers and directors spend substan-
tial time on efforts to meet expectations of short-
term results.  That time instead could be spent 
on devising and implementing strategies that add 
enduring value to the company.  
• Managing earnings, by shifting revenues forward 
and deferring costs, misleads investors and mis-
allocates capital.  When costs no longer can be 
deferred, the day of reckoning may cause investors 
to shift resources suddenly, thereby destroying 
economic value.  
• Generous compensation of corporate managers, 
investment fund managers, and others for achiev-
ing financial targets that do not in fact correspond 
to the creation of economic value is a direct waste 
of resources.  Worse than the direct costs of such 
misallocated payments, the payments themselves 
cause managers to misallocate corporate resources 
(as noted above).  
• Although financial markets have recently experi-
enced low volatility, economists have measured a 
higher risk premium for assets that are subject to 
greater variability, and hence risk, due to frequent 
trading by speculators targeting short-term move-
ments in share prices.9 
• One measure of the cost of short-termism can 
be derived from the extra expenses incurred by 
mutual funds due to active trading.  If the aver-
age mutual fund incurs an estimated 70-80 basis 
points of added costs from overactive trading, the 
resulting loss to investors would have amounted to 
about $60 billion to $70 billion in 2005 alone.10  
We are concerned, too, by an infrequently noted but 
pernicious effect of managerial short-termism on a 
company’s line employees and, consequently, on the 
company itself.  As an example, managers under pres-
sure to meet quarterly earnings goals may feel forced 
to lay off employees.  Such layoffs affect the attitudes, 
decision making, motivation, and productivity of those 
who remain.  Short-term thinking then permeates the 
company.  Hiring practices are affected, as are train-
ing, maintenance schedules, and ultimately the quality 
of goods or services the company produces.  A vicious 
cycle exacerbates problems that were once short-term 
in nature, and they become embedded and potentially 
threaten the company’s long-term viability.
Recommendation to Change Board 
Practices 
There is no single-bullet solution to the problem of 
short-termism.  The recommendations of this report 
aim to identify some of the best board practices that 
can promote long-term corporate performance.  We do 
not intend to mandate any particular solution to any 
specific business problem.  Our goal is to change the 
framework in which directors’ decisions are made to 
give added weight to the long-term value proposition 
relative to the short-term expedient.  Accordingly, we 
suggest a number of areas in which such a change in 
focus would be particularly helpful.
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We recognize that the problem of short-termism is 
not confined to the boardroom or even to the corpora-
tion.  It easily can be found among asset managers who 
are paid on the basis of short-term results, securities 
analysts who feed information into the financial system, 
and many others whose incentives drive them to focus 
on the immediate, rather than long-term, results.  
Nevertheless, the location of activity is inside the 
corporation.  We, therefore, focus our recommenda-
tions on one group that can make a difference through 
leadership to promote long-term economic perfor-
mance: corporate directors.  in our view, directors 
(and boards) can best counter the growth of short-
termism by demonstrating to executives and capital 
markets that concerns for long-term performance 
trump interests in short-term stock price move-
ments.  This can be accomplished by realigning 
executive compensation incentives for long-term per-
formance, developing more meaningful reporting of 
a company’s performance and long-term intent, and 
ending the practice of quarterly earnings guidance.  
The following chapters examine these recommenda-
tions in greater detail.  
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“Corporate governance” encompasses a broad array of 
activities, goals, and relationships.  Practitioners and 
observers typically focus on well-functioning commit-
tee structures (for compensation, audit, and gover-
nance) composed of independent directors to ensure 
that management serves shareholders’ interests, capital 
assets are wisely deployed, and corporate managers 
behave ethically and legally.  The reaction to recent cor-
porate scandals has been to bolster the role of directors 
as “watchdog.”  As essential as that role is, it should not 
preempt the equally important tasks of providing over-
sight of the corporation’s strategy for future growth and 
holding management accountable for its execution.11
In a broad sense, shareholders’ interests are best served 
by corporate governance that seeks to increase the value 
of the corporation and, hence, the shareholder’s stake 
in it over the long term.  This chapter examines how 
directors can better serve the central goal of long-term 
value creation by:
• supporting the development of strategic plans with 
sound long-term objectives; 
• linking executive compensation more closely to 
strategic drivers of long-term performance; and
• promoting succession planning and addressing 
shortened CEO tenures. 
The next chapter addresses the need to promote trans-
parent reporting of the company’s financial and non-fi-
nancial indicators of performance. 
Supporting Strategic Plans with Long-Term 
Objectives
Any definition of the role of a director of a public com-
pany in the United States in the 21st century includes 
the essential tasks of reviewing, ratifying, and monitor-
ing implementation of the company’s strategic plans.12  
At a minimum, the board of directors is responsible for 
overseeing and understanding a strategic plan devel-
oped and executed by management.  As an assemblage 
of presumably accomplished, wise men and women 
with business experience, a board can be more than a 
passive rubber stamp for management’s plans.  
acting in the shareholders’ interests, the board 
should be constructively engaged with management 
in promoting the development of long-term strate-
gies.13  such engagement should avoid the pitfall 
of micromanagement; rather, it should focus on 
the process of reviewing, appraising, and enrich-
ing management’s plan, and holding management 
accountable for its continuing evolution and execu-
tion.  To be clear, we are not suggesting that boards 
usurp management functions by formulating indepen-
dent strategies.  Directors surveyed about how best 
to foster long-term shareholder value overwhelmingly 
(84 percent of responses) said that the best scenario is 
one where the CEO and board have joint and separate 
responsibilities--each working together toward com-
mon goals without losing sight of fiduciary duties.14  
Directors also say they want more information about 
strategic concerns.
Many of the post-Enron reforms aim to empower 
directors to ask more questions, provide stronger 
oversight of management’s performance, and gener-
ally be more assertive in meeting their fiduciary duties.  
Directors can fulfill their duties by questioning how 
management’s strategy enhances the long-term value 
of the company, how management assesses risks, and 
how it will execute its strategy.  We are concerned by 
survey findings that over half of directors do not have 
more than a “limited” understanding of their company’s 
long-term objectives. 15  Certainly, we find it hard to see 
how a board could share responsibility for a company’s 
strategy—which it must—if it does not make the effort 
to understand and “buy into” that strategy.  Of course, 
the precise nature of a board’s participation will depend 
on the specific circumstances of the company and its 
leadership.  
After reviewing and approving a strategy, the board 
should stay involved by holding management account-
Chapter II:  
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able for that strategy and ensuring oversight of the 
assessment of enterprise-wide risks to the company.  
Directors should work with management to under-
stand and evaluate short- and long-term risks, and their 
relationship with and contribution to value creation 
and the overall health of the organization.  Directors 
should measure executives’ performance against stra-
tegic goals.  They also should scrutinize executives’ 
presentations in the context of long-term strategy.  For 
example, in view of findings that executives would delay 
new projects to meet short-term earnings targets even 
if it meant a sacrifice in longer-term value, directors 
should ask questions about potential projects not being 
funded and about assets sold that may make earnings 
look better.  Such oversight sends a message and a tone 
from the top that the board cares about long-term 
performance and disapproves of efforts to meet only 
short-term earnings numbers.
Ensuring the Tie Between Long-Term 
Performance and Executive Compensation 
The board’s compensation committee is responsible 
for aligning the corporation’s executive compensation 
program with its strategic plan.  Because executives, like 
most people, tend to do that for which they are paid, 
aligning a meaningful portion of incentive compensa-
tion to longer-term results is the single best way to 
motivate executives to focus on long-term performance. 
The system of corporate governance in the United 
States has gone through significant changes over the 
course of the past decade.  Many of these changes, such 
as new disclosure requirements, have yet to work their 
way entirely through the system.  We should give them 
a chance to work before piling on new requirements.  
Compensation committees composed of independent 
directors should be able to structure compensation 
incentives to encourage superior long-term perfor-
mance.  Compensation committees, however, need 
to be diligent about aligning compensation to the 
company’s strategic plan rather than to executive-pay 
consultants’ benchmarks of industry comparables.  Part 
of that process ought to include greater dialogue with 
major shareholders who, in broad terms, are seeking to 
communicate their views on the relationship between 
compensation and performance.
In the 2006 report, CED laid out a framework for 
reforming the system used to determine executive pay 
Box 1.  Recommendations of Private 
Enterprise, Public Trust
compensation committees should adopt measurable, 
specific, and genuinely challenging goals for the per-
formance of their businesses, and judge management 
on their ability to achieve them.  These goals should 
be financial (returns on assets, investment, or equity), 
strategic (market share, quality improvement), opera-
tional (margins, revenues or profits), and social (such as 
adherence to the corporate code of conduct).  
The compensation process must be run by inde-
pendent compensation committees.  compensation 
consultants, if any, should have no business or other 
relationships with management (neither should the 
firms for which they work).  They should be hired by 
and report to a compensation committee of the board 
that is autonomous from management, and that con-
trols the terms of the consultant’s engagement.  
management should have a substantial equity inter-
est in their company.  This interest should be over 
and above equity derived through options or grants.  
Barring exceptional circumstances, management should 
act as “buy and hold” investors.
management should make a full, timely, and trans-
parent disclosure of its compensation to stockhold-
ers.  The compensation discussion should be presented 
in one place in the company’s disclosure, including all 
forms of compensation.  Disclosures should be compre-
hensive and easily understandable, and the SEC should 
consider better ways of showing the relative size of 
executive compensation and its trend.
choices of forms of compensation should promote 
the long-term value of the firm, rather than exploit 
favorable accounting or tax treatment.  
severance compensation, like all other forms of 
executive compensation, should be reviewed carefully 
against criteria set by the compensation committee of 
the board, and the board should publicly provide full 
details of awards and explain publicly to sharehold-
ers the full reasoning behind the granting of such 
awards.  
companies should have the right to recapture 
bonuses awarded to top executives in error, because 
financial results justifying those awards later are 
restated adversely.  
Source: CED, Private Enterprise, Public Trust: The State of 
Corporate America After Sarbanes-Oxley
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in many U.S. corporations.16  The report’s recommen-
dations emphasize transparency and accountability on 
the part of independent compensation committees and 
predominantly independent boards of directors.  (See 
Box 1.)  
Recent governance reforms create the expectation 
that compensation committees will curtail excessive 
executive compensation, improve the link between 
pay and performance, and articulate more clearly how 
the various components of compensation enhance 
the company’s performance.  Over time, changes in 
practice should improve the linkage between pay and 
performance. Reform advocates have focused more on 
curbing unwarranted pay than on shifting incentives to 
long-term benchmarks. The next step is to improve the 
link to long-term performance.
Although the foundation is in place to strengthen the 
link between pay and performance, at too many compa-
nies performance triggers are tied to near-term finan-
cial indicators such as earnings per share or one-year 
share-price performance.  These practices encourage 
executives to adopt too short a time horizon, and to 
focus more on short-term share price and accounting 
measures than on long-term performance.  A 2006 
study of Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) companies 
by The Corporate Library showed very little correlation 
between the largest percentage increases in total execu-
tive compensation and long-term value creation.17     
as in previous reports, we urge compensation 
committees composed of independent directors to 
construct pay packages that motivate executives to 
maximize the company’s long-term economic value.  
In the 2006 report, CED stated that “compensation 
committees should adopt measurable, specific, and 
genuinely challenging goals” for the performance of 
their companies and their executives.18  These goals 
should be integrated with the company’s strategic plan 
and the value drivers of that plan.  Thus, for example, 
if a company’s strategic plan puts great emphasis on 
research and development, its compensation plan ought 
to link rewards to success in R&D.  Compensation 
committees may also want to spell out (in both quan-
titative and qualitative terms) the types of long-term 
concerns they expect their CEO and other execu-
tives to address, such as employee retention, customer 
satisfaction, adaptability to changes in public policies, 
or various other appropriate indicators for evaluating 
the executive’s contribution to the company’s long-term 
strategy.    
compensation committees should align company 
executives’ financial interests and incentives with the 
long-term health of the company and its stock price.*‡ 
Inasmuch as we subscribe to the principle that CEOs 
and other top executives should be “at risk,” boards 
should consider requiring them to purchase a substan-
tial number of the company’s shares over time with 
their own money (not just from compensation awards) 
and hold shares equal to a multiple of base salary, ap-
propriate to their circumstances.  In general, executives 
should be required to act as “buy-and-hold” investors.  
The specific situations of the company, its CEO, and 
other executives should determine, on a case-by-case 
basis, how compensation committees establish such 
targets, how the targets should be achieved, and under 
what circumstances a CEO would be permitted to sell 
stock.  Under such a policy, executives will be exposed 
not only to their company’s fortunes but also to general 
market conditions independent of the company’s spe-
cific performance.  To offset the influence of general ups 
and downs of the market, some companies have used 
market indexes or other indicators of relative perfor-
mance to ensure to the extent possible that executives 
are compensated for their performance rather than on 
the basis of factors beyond their control.  The use of 
indexed options, for example, is discussed below.
for similar reasons of alignment with sharehold-
ers’ interests, directors also should be required to 
buy and hold the company’s shares.  Setting aside the 
question of how they should be compensated, direc-
tors with a significant equity stake in the company on 
whose board they serve will have incentives that are 
well matched to those of long-term investors.  While 
compensation plans typically provide a way for a direc-
tor to own an equity interest in the company, shares 
bought with one’s own resources and held throughout 
one’s tenure provide for stronger alignment of director’ 
incentives with shareholders’ interests.  
Vesting and exercise periods for executives’ equity 
grants–options or shares—should be increased beyond 
existing practice and tied to multi-year performance 
*‡ See Memorandum Page 26
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hurdles. Stock option grants, until very recently, have 
been a favored and significant component of executive 
compensation. §  Stock options were viewed by many as 
a means both to attract top-notch candidates and align 
the interests of shareholders and executives.  Options 
can be structured in various ways.  A common practice 
is for employment-based options to have a strike price 
equal to the market price when granted, have a ten-year 
life, and become exercisable in three years.   Prior to a 
recent change in the accounting standard, favorable tax 
and accounting treatments accorded to performance-
based options made the options appear to be nearly 
costless to the company while the process of granting 
them was opaque and, thus, ripe for exploitation.**  A 
troubling result was the incentive created for executives 
with expiring options to attempt to boost the share 
price – and thus their personal fortunes – sometimes at 
the expense of the long-term health of the company.  
Although, for reasons relating to the change in account-
ing treatment, options have fallen into disfavor, some 
companies have found ways to use options in a manner 
consistent with the goal of rewarding executives for 
superior long-term performance.  For example, options 
can be indexed to peer groups, made exercisable at a 
price above the market price when granted, or tied to 
the achievement of performance objectives.  IBM, for 
example, began in 2004 to use premium-priced op-
tions—with a strike price 10 percent above the market 
price when issued—that vest in four years. 
Executives also can be required to hold shares acquired 
through the exercise of an option.  For example, Cisco 
and J.P. Morgan Chase have lengthened stock option 
vesting periods to five years and upwards.  Since 2002, 
J.P. Morgan Chase, like other companies recently, 
has required senior executives to retain 75 percent of 
the net shares of stock granted through equity-based 
awards for the entire duration of their employment 
with the company.19  
Johnson & Johnson has a distinctive long-term incen-
tive plan tied to five-year financial and non-financial 
performance measures.  It employs two separate long-
term incentive programs.  One, known as the “certificate 
of extra compensation” (CEC) plan, was established in 
1947 as a commitment to “managing the business for 
the long term.” Awards (in the form of “performance 
units”) granted under the CEC plan are subject to a 
five-year vesting schedule and are not paid until the end 
of an employee’s career.20   
Many companies have responded to the change in the 
accounting and reporting of stock options by turning to 
grants of restricted stock (or equivalent shadow units).  
When granted restricted stock, the recipient does not 
gain the right to transfer the stock until certain con-
ditions have been met.  Typically the conditions, or 
vesting requirements, are time-based, but they also can 
be performance-based, or a combination of the two.  In 
2005, the value of restricted stock grants awarded by 
S&P 500 companies increased by 22 percent from the 
previous year, while the value of stock option grants 
awarded by these same companies decreased 17 per-
cent.21
Grants of restricted stock do not by themselves change 
a manager’s incentives over the time horizon.  The con-
ditions attached to restricted stock grants are the key to 
the incentives of executives who receive them.   A short 
vesting period would provide executives with almost 
the same incentive to boost stock price as they have 
with options.  In fact, because restricted shares have an 
effective strike price of zero, executives gain from any 
positive stock price, even if it decreases from its value 
when granted.  
Some companies have structured restricted stock 
grants to provide a greater incentive for long-term per-
formance by adding performance conditions dependent 
on meeting specified targets such as return on invested 
capital, market share, total sales, pre-tax or after-tax 
profit levels, or cash flow.  
An unusual example of practice in this area is provided 
by GE, which awards performance share units (PSUs) 
tied to multiple-year performance.  GE’s CEO, Jeffrey 
§  A stock option grant provides the holder with the right to purchase a given number of shares of stock at a set price, often called the strike price, after a 
specified vesting period has elapsed.  If the market price exceeds the strike price at the end of the vesting period, executives can profit by purchasing stock 
at the lower strike price and then reselling it at the market price. 
 
**  The Financial Accounting Standards Board published Statement No. 123 (revised 2004), Share-Based Payment. Statement 123(R) on December 16, 
2004.
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Immelt, is paid annually in PSUs subject to perfor-
mance conditions tied to a two-year period.  Long-
term PSUs are tied to a five-year performance period.  
Thus, in 2005 Mr. Immelt was granted PSUs that will 
convert to GE stock only if the company’s performance 
meets benchmarks for the 2005-2009 period.  As 
CEO, Mr. Immelt also is required to own GE stock 
equal to at least six times his annual base salary.  
Another award used by GE to motivate senior execu-
tives, including the CEO, is the “contingent long-term 
performance award,” which is granted every three years 
and tied to specific financial performance goals.  Thus, 
in February 2006 GE granted contingent long-term 
performance awards payable in 2009 only if the compa-
ny achieves specified goals over the 2006-2008 period 
related to the growth rate of average earnings per share 
and average revenue, average return on capital, and 
cumulative cash flow from operations.  In March 2006, 
GE paid out awards granted in 2003 for performance 
from 2003-2005.
compensation committees should engage major 
shareholders in a dialogue on executive compensa-
tion programs.   Investor groups recently have begun 
to press for advisory votes on executive compensation.  
In a January 25, 2007 letter addressed to SEC chair-
man Christopher Cox, representatives from 13 global 
institutional investors (mostly United Kingdom-based 
pension funds plus the State of Connecticut retirement 
fund) asked for support for what has been termed a 
“say on pay” procedure.  That procedure would allow 
shareholders an opportunity to express general ap-
proval or disapproval of a company’s executive com-
pensation plan.22  On April 20, 2007, the U.S. House 
of Representatives voted to mandate advisory votes on 
executive compensation.  Such a procedure has been in 
use in the UK since 2003 and in Australia since 2005.  
A study of FTSE 100 companies appears to support 
the global investors’ claim that since the introduc-
tion of advisory votes companies are more frequently 
using longer-term performance targets in incentive 
compensation plans and customizing those targets to 
company-specific circumstances and strategic plans.23  
The investor group also observes that shareholders and 
proxy voting consultants seem to be focusing more on 
the link between pay and long-term performance.  
Although we support the goal of engaging shareholders 
on the question of executive compensation, currently 
we do not support an advisory vote on compensation 
policy.  Specifically, we are concerned that an advisory 
vote in the context of U.S. corporate governance prac-
tice would send mixed and confusing signals, working 
against rather than for responsible engagement.  It 
seems a crude instrument for communicating about 
a complex topic.  How should a no vote, or even a yes 
vote, be interpreted?  Some voters might focus on the 
overall compensation policy, while others might vote 
on the basis of specific details and outcomes.  Also, 
how would an advisory vote, which in the U.S. context 
would usually come after policies had been established, 
affect the implementation of those policies? 
We are, in addition, hesitant to recommend a U.S. 
policy based on limited observations of behavior in 
markets outside the United States.  The U.K. policy is 
part of a broader system of corporate governance and 
government regulation that is far different from that of 
the United States.  Lifting one policy out of that system 
and transplanting it into another may not lead to the 
result supporters expect.  For example, the U.S. capital 
market recently has become concerned with the phe-
nomenon of “empty voting,” which allows shareholders 
to decouple voting rights from economic ownership of 
shares.24  The potential for empty voting, or “vote buy-
ing,” on the part of outside interests, or on the part of 
corporate insiders, creates questions about the possible 
manipulation of shareholder advisory votes.   
More broadly, we see no reason for shareholders to 
vote only on a company’s executive compensation plan 
rather than any of the other major decisions taken by a 
board of directors.  Shareholders, for example, do not 
vote on a company’s investment policies, which may be 
more significant to the long-term, or even short-term, 
performance of the company.  The proper means for 
shareholders to express their opinions on executive 
compensation is through their votes for directors who 
represent them or through communication with those 
directors.  
Because the goal of those supporting a vote is to create 
a dialogue about pay issues, we urge compensation 
committees to initiate such a dialogue up front.  We 
also encourage U.S. companies to take steps within the 
U.S. system to engage long-term investors on compen-
sation practice and its link to value creation for the long 
term.  A good place to start would be for compensa-
tion committees to implement fully the compensa-
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tion disclosure requirement called “Compensation 
Discussion and Analysis” (CD&A).  The requirement 
is “principles-based,” and the SEC has made clear that 
CD&A should be written in plain English.  The SEC 
has said that the purpose of the CD&A disclosure is to 
provide material information and perspective about the 
company’s executive compensation objectives.25  
The current year, 2007, is the first in which CD&A 
reports are to be filed.  We know of few, if any, compa-
nies that have met investor expectations of customized 
and tailored disclosure.  Indeed, SEC Chairman Cox 
has publicly complained that, relative to the SEC’s 
goals, submissions are unreadable, too long, and overly 
burdened with lawyers’ jargon.26
That assessment indicates that companies have missed 
an opportunity to explain to shareholders, equity 
analysts, and the market in general how the design of 
compensation practices is integrated with performance 
goals.  Making good use of CD&A and of dialogue 
with major shareholders could go some distance toward 
improving both investor relations and the link between 
compensation and performance.  
Promoting Succession Planning and 
Addressing Shortened CEO Tenures
The shortened tenure of today’s CEOs has turned 
those executives’ attention to short-term results—and 
to achieving compensation for those short-term re-
sults—to ensure their wealth positions in light of 
uncertain, but likely short, tenures.  CEOs today are 
three times more likely to be fired than were CEOs 
hired before 1985.27  In the United States, the average 
tenure of CEOs replaced for performance reasons fell 
from 8.9 years in 1995 to 4.9 years in 2000, and this 
trend appears to be accelerating.28  In 2005, a then-
record 1,322 CEOs of American companies left their 
posts; in 2006 the number rose to 1,340.29  A study of 
North American companies conducted by Booz Allen 
& Hamilton concluded that, in 2005, 35 percent of 
departing CEOs were forced out and approximately 44 
percent left voluntarily, with the remaining departures 
attributable to mergers.30  In any event, whether CEOs 
are dismissed, retired, or leave their jobs due to merger, 
the time they have to affect their companies has de-
clined dramatically.
Another trend over the same period also has affected 
CEO performance.  In the past 20 to 30 years, we have 
seen an evolution from CEOs who were nurtured and 
developed within a company, and who usually served 
at the will of the board without a contract, to a greater 
number of CEOs who are hired from outside and, for 
legitimate reasons, are employed by contract.  In the 
1980s, only 10 percent of newly hired CEOs came 
from outside the company, compared with nearly 20 
percent in the 1990s.31  Similarly, fewer than 25 percent 
of CEOs at big companies had employment contracts 
forty years ago, whereas close to three fourths of CEOs 
of S&P 500 companies have employment contracts or 
severance plans today.32 
The difference between the contract and non-con-
tract CEOs may be subtle but important.  Although 
there have been some outstanding CEOs who have 
been hired from outside and worked under contract, 
we would like to see boards pay more attention to 
developing internal talent.  At a minimum, doing so 
would reduce pressure on a compensation committee 
to offer an exorbitant contract to an incoming CEO, 
because there would be a home-grown alternative.  
When a CEO is hired from another company, he or 
she is usually compensated for the income left behind, 
and that person will want to be protected against the 
risk of being dismissed if expectations are not met 
quickly.  Accordingly, employment contracts tend to be 
front-loaded with all kinds of benefits, and laden with 
expensive severance provisions, that do not encourage 
a long-term view of the company’s health.  The recent 
experience of Home Depot, with its oversized sever-
ance payment for its departing CEO, is a case in point.  
By contrast, a CEO from an internal executive develop-
ment and succession program already has a long-term 
view of the company when he or she takes office, and 
front-loading of benefits is not necessary.  
among the most valuable contributions directors 
can make to promote long-term performance is to 
ensure that the company has a strong succession plan 
and grows managerial talent internally.  Under the 
circumstances of today’s shortened tenures of CEOs, 
boards may need to be much more pro-active than in 
the past in developing internal talent.  The incentives 
impinging upon the short-term CEO make it less likely 
he or she will expend effort developing rather than 

discouraging possible successors.  One of the benefits 
of separating the positions of board chair and CEO is 
that it may avoid this problem.  A non-executive chair 
generally provides a longer-term context for develop-
ment of internal executive talent.  
Survey research indicates that companies that do an 
effective job of CEO succession planning tend to be 
among the most admired by corporate executives.33   
Boards of  “admired companies” are also more likely to 
receive regular updates on potential internal candidates 
for leadership positions.  Some of these boards discuss 
succession issues in executive sessions, or form succes-
sion committees to work with the incumbent CEO on 
a long-term transition.
In line with a recommendation of the National 
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) Blue 
Ribbon Commission on Executive Compensation, we 
recommend that compensation committees consider 
alternatives to contracts at the ceo level.34  When 
contracts are necessary, they should be devised care-
fully to pursue the company’s long-term goals over a 
realistic time frame.  As the NACD committee points 
out, compensation committees should consider wheth-
er a contract for a CEO is truly necessary.  If it decides 
to use a contract, it should understand the potential 
consequences of all contract provisions.  All contracts 
should have reasonable “sunset” provisions.  A notice of 
non-renewal for an employment agreement, or a retire-
ment, should not automatically give rise to severance.35
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Quarterly financial reports and readers thereof typi-
cally focus too much attention on one financial indica-
tor: earnings per share.  In our 2006 statement, Private 
Enterprise, Public Trust, CED challenged the myth that 
financial reports provide a precise measurement of 
corporate performance.  Our conclusion remains that 
“stock analysts, the investing public, and regulators 
must recognize the inherently judgmental character 
of accounting statements and financial information.  
ranges of values rather than precise numbers should 
be explained and understood as such.  in addition, 
financial statements should be supplemented with 
non-financial indicators of value.” 36
The apparent, but false, precision of financial state-
ments feeds the narrow focus of managers, investors, 
directors, and analysts on the earnings-per-share num-
ber.  Observers concerned about short-termism view 
company forecasts of quarterly changes in earnings per 
share, and analysts’ and shareholders’ reliance on those 
forecasts, as among the primary causes of short-term 
behavior, including the kinds of accounting manipula-
tions practiced by Enron, WorldCom, and others to 
“make their numbers.”  
Among other factors feeding short-term behavior is the 
circular relationship between companies’ provision of 
quarterly financial data and traders’ demand for such 
data.  Headline numbers in a company’s press release 
can move the market price of its shares initially in one 
direction—and, later, back the other way, once analysts 
have time to ferret out details and footnotes in official 
filings.  If company managers can even temporarily 
boost the price of their company’s shares by “spinning” 
results, they may be tempted to do so, thereby encour-
aging further speculation.37  
Ordinarily, though past earnings provide indications of 
past performance, they are insufficient for forecasting a 
company’s cash flows and its long-term value.  For one 
thing, even with tighter accounting rules, companies 
retain sufficient discretion (for example, in estimat-
ing accruals and in accelerating revenues and defer-
ring expenses from one period to another—exactly 
the kind of short-term behavior we oppose) that they 
can hit their earnings-per-share numbers and satisfy 
accounting principles, but without accurately reflect-
ing economic performance.  Also, the vast majority of 
a company’s value—estimated by one study to be 95 
percent—comes not from existing contracts reflected 
in financial statements but from expectations of future 
sales and purchase contracts.38  As companies state in 
commonly used boilerplate language, “past performance 
is not necessarily indicative of future results.”
our recommended solution is to improve the rele-
vance, transparency, and utility of company-reported 
information by redesigning business reports to in-
clude useful non-financial indicators of value, such as 
those proposed by the enhanced Business reporting 
consortium, and dropping the use of quarterly earn-
ings guidance.  Although these reforms may not by 
themselves end short-term behavior in financial mar-
kets, they will support those—both inside and outside 
the company—who want to take a longer-term view of 
corporate performance.  Moreover, these reforms are 
useful on their own terms.  
Redesigning Business Reporting 
Providers and users of financial information are in-
creasingly vocal in complaining that the current system 
of accounting measurement, principles, and disclosure 
is more complicated and more costly than it should be.  
Investors also contend that the system is so outmoded 
that it fails to provide as much useful information as it 
could.  Disclosures mandated by government regula-
tors are similarly problematic.  One significant diffi-
culty cited is that “intangibles” (such as the value of the 
company’s brand or its relationships with employees, 
suppliers and customers), which often drive company 
performance, are not well measured, or not measured 
at all, under current accounting conventions.39  Under 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 
spending for certain types of intangibles is treated as 
Chapter III:  
Develop More Meaningful Indicators of Corporate Value
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an expense, which lowers calculated earnings per share 
and acts as a disincentive to investment in worker train-
ing, R&D, and other activities that pay off only beyond 
the immediate quarter.  Similar, if not larger, problems 
exist in accounting for liabilities.  
Current models of accounting and other forms of 
corporate reporting generally have not kept pace with 
changes in business and the economy.  The typical 
modern corporation is much larger and more complex 
than in earlier eras.  It relies more on intangible assets, 
and it produces more services than goods.  In addition, 
it is now possible for companies to provide much more 
contextual, qualitative, and non-financial information 
than they could in decades past, and to provide all data 
much more rapidly and efficiently—even if most com-
panies have not yet invested adequately in necessary 
reporting systems or are reluctant to do so for various 
reasons, such as concerns about liability or loss of com-
petitive advantage.  CED addressed many of these is-
sues in the 2006 report.  (See Box 2.)  In this report, we 
take the further step of examining financial and other 
business reporting as it concerns investors’—and their 
director representatives’—need to look down the road 
to the business’ sustainability and future profitability.
Develop Better Indicators of Long-Term 
Performance and Sustainability 
A business reporting system shapes the way decision 
makers—investors, directors, and managers—view 
and judge results.  It affects the strategies they develop 
for allocating resources.  A substantial body of recent 
work by individuals and organizations seeks to improve 
business reporting by adding information not required 
by the current system.  Efforts to improve and enhance 
business reporting tend to converge around several key 
principles:
• retain the strengths of the current system;
• increase clarity, openness and transparency to us-
ers;
• base reporting more on  principles;
• incorporate more non-financial indicators of per-
formance;
• incorporate information about uncertainties, and 
explicitly state the assumptions behind the pre-
sented estimates;
Box 2.  Recommendations of Private 
Enterprise, Public Trust on Financial 
Reporting
The presentation of information in financial reports 
must change, and the interested public’s understanding 
of that information must change as well.  
financial statements would be more useful if they 
were governed by fewer rules and displayed more of 
the judgment that lies behind estimated numbers.  
“Profits” or “revenues” or “value” are not like “tem-
perature” or “mass” – they cannot be measured with 
precision.  Their estimation requires judgment.  The 
tendency to focus excessively on precise but potentially 
misleading accounting has been called “the brittle illu-
sion of accounting exactitude.” 
The goal of financial statements must be to provide 
a truly fair and clear presentation of the firm.  stock 
analysts, the investing public, and regulators must 
recognize the inherently judgmental character of 
accounting statements and financial information.  It 
must be widely understood that judgments have an 
enormous impact on the numbers used in financial 
statements.  Because financial statements rely on judg-
ments, accounting cannot continue to rely on the brittle 
illusion of accounting exactitude.  ranges of values 
rather than precise numbers must be explained and 
understood as such.
financial statements should be supplemented with 
non-financial indicators of value. 
Although such a system may take time to develop fully, 
we must get started on this road.
auditors should not be required, or assumed, to “at-
test” to specific numbers, such as earnings per share.  
Auditors’ attestations should be seen as an opinion 
on whether the financial statements taken as a whole 
are fairly stated, not whether each number is precisely 
correct.  If their “attestations” are properly qualified, 
investors will be on notice of the unavoidable ambiguity 
in certain numbers.
financial disclosures should be as clear and concise 
as possible, so as not to confuse the reader or bury 
unfavorable information.  Financial disclosures should 
be written in plain English.  
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• incorporate a more meaningful discussion of both 
upside potential and downside risks; and
• narrow differences between U.S. and international 
standards.
Although this report and its recommendations focus 
on the role of corporate directors, many other actors 
share similar concerns and their work can provide 
context for consideration of longer-term thinking.  For 
example: the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) and the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) are undertaking a major effort to create 
a common conceptual framework for an internationally 
converged accounting standard; FASB and IASB also 
have initiated a “financial statement presentation proj-
ect” to establish a common, high-quality standard for 
the presentation of information in financial statements; 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is ex-
amining ways to reduce accounting complexity; and the 
SEC is promoting the use of “interactive data” based 
on the XBRL computer standard.  Although none of 
these efforts is specifically aimed at the promotion of a 
longer-term perspective, each could improve the quality, 
relevance, and transparency of reported information, 
and enhance users’ ability to make a reasonable assess-
ment of a company’s long-term prospects.  Although 
many believe these developments will help promote a 
long-term perspective, their potential to feed additional 
short-termism reemphasizes the importance of direc-
tors’ influence in ensuring that their company’s public 
reporting reflects a long-term framework.  
The provision of information specifically relevant to 
a company’s future prospects is the focus of other 
proposals being developed by various individuals and 
groups.  The consulting firm McKinsey and Co., for 
example, has proposed an approach that distinguishes 
between information about a company’s past perfor-
mance and its future health, or long-term sustainabil-
ity.40  Corporate “health” indicators, as a supplement to 
performance measures, would help to assess the com-
pany’s future by focusing on the underlying economics 
and how it creates value.††  Such information would 
include short-term, but more granular, data—about 
sales productivity, operating costs, and the uses of 
capital.  Medium-term indicators might point toward 
the likelihood the company could maintain perfor-
mance over one to five years—including information 
about the product pipeline, brand strength, regulatory 
risks, customer satisfaction, cost structure, competitive 
threats, and asset depreciation, among other factors.  
Long-term indicators would show the company’s ability 
to sustain competitive advantage, withstand market 
erosion, and expand into growth areas.  These longer-
term indicators would focus on risks, such as changes 
in technologies, consumer tastes, or threats to the 
company’s brand value,  and probably would be qualita-
tive in nature.
One of the most significant ongoing efforts to im-
prove how companies report on performance is be-
ing undertaken by the Enhanced Business Reporting 
Consortium (EBRC).  The EBRC is a U.S.-based 
non-profit that seeks “to improve the quality, integ-
rity and transparency of information used for deci-
sion-making.”‡‡41  Its goal is to promote a voluntary 
framework for the presentation and disclosure of “value 
drivers”—the elements of a company’s business that are 
the sources of its value—and other information that 
would inform investors about a company’s longer-term 
prospects.  Such disclosure may include key quantita-
tive indicators of performance, or qualitative factors 
such as business opportunities, risks, strategies and 
plans—which would allow readers to assess the quality, 
sustainability and variability of the company’s future 
cash flows and earnings.  Research shows that only 25 
percent of an entity’s market value can be attributed to 
accounting book value, with the remaining 75 percent 
based on earnings performance and value drivers such 
as strategy, product innovation, people and customer 
loyalty.  But less than 25 percent of the value drivers 
generally associated with the industry sectors surveyed 
are identified in formal filings.42  
††  McKinsey authors note the similarity between their approach and the “balanced scorecard” approach developed by Robert Kaplan and David Norton 
in a 1992 Harvard Business Review article, “The Balanced Scorecard: Measures that Drive Performance.” 
 
‡‡ The EBRC was founded by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Grant Thornton LLP, Microsoft Corp., and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.  It now includes numerous other advisors and strategic partners, some of whom are members of CED’s corporate gover-
nance subcommittee that prepared this report.  
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As a detailed illustration of enhanced reporting, we re-
produce above the EBR Framework Version 1.0, which 
is based on four categories of information: 
• Business landscape – provides the company’s per-
spective on the business and economic climate as 
well as on other external forces that could affect the 
entity’s business strategy and its ability to achieve 
success.
• strategy – communicates not only the business 
strategy, but also how the organization and the 
underlying structures support the execution of 
strategy.
• competencies and resources – describes how the 
company manages available resources and compe-
tencies to execute its strategy.  A principal goal of 
this section is identification and discussion of value 
drivers—the elements of a company’s business that 
are the sources of its value.
Level 1 Level 2
Business landscape Overview
Competition
Customers
Technological change
Shareholder relations
Capital availability
Legal
Political
Regulatory
Strategy Business model
Organization
Governance
Risk management
Environmental & social
Business portfolio
Resource allocation
Product life cycle
Competencies & resources Key processes 
Customer satisfaction
People
Innovation
Supply chain
Intellectual property
Information & technology
Financial assets
Physical assets
Performance Profitability
Liquidity
Operating
Segment
Table.  Enhanced Business Reporting Framework*
* The Enhanced Business Reporting Framework, Public Exposure Draft, October 2005
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• Performance – provides insight into whether the 
company has produced results in line with expecta-
tions. This section explains results in relation to the 
preceding sections.  Key performance indicators or 
narrative about qualitative factors presented in this 
section should enable stakeholders to assess the 
sustainability of business practices and the qual-
ity and variability of a company’s cash flows and 
profitability.
for their internal assessments of performance, we 
recommend that directors encourage management 
to adopt reporting systems that focus attention on 
“value drivers” and long-term risks, such as those 
proposed by the enhanced Business reporting 
framework.  directors may consider requesting re-
ports on such metrics as part of the information pro-
vided in the board package.  companies also should 
voluntarily provide information derived from those 
systems to complement public financial reports.  
Directors are uniquely positioned to adopt a “value-
driver” framework for internal deliberations, and many 
have.  Such a framework allows the board better to 
monitor management’s performance by keeping in-
formed of long-term value drivers and other key indica-
tors.  As suggested above, compensation committees 
also could use such a framework as a tool for evaluating 
and compensating management. 
Ultimately, the goal should be to use a system such as 
the EBR Framework in both internal deliberations 
and public disclosures.  Public reporting of non-fi-
nancial indicators, consistent with the EBR initiative, 
could be implemented in public reports without any 
rule changes.  Public companies are required to in-
clude with financial statements a narrative known as 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A).43  
One of the primary principles of MD&A is to give 
readers “an opportunity to look at the company through 
the eyes of management by providing both a short and 
long-term analysis of the business of the company.”44  
A 2003 SEC interpretive release provided several 
useful suggestions, which remain valuable consider-
ations for companies today, on how companies could 
improve MD&A.45  According to the SEC’s guidance, 
companies are encouraged to discuss key performance 
indicators, including non-financial indicators of perfor-
mance.  With regard to overall presentation, the SEC 
suggested that companies: present their disclosure so 
that the most important information is most promi-
nent; avoid unnecessary duplicative disclosure that can 
be an obstacle to identifying and understanding mate-
rial concerns; and start the narrative by providing an 
executive-level overview that provides context for the 
remainder of the discussion.  In short, MD&A should 
be written in a manner that allows for relatively easy 
comprehension.  Companies could, for example, use the 
EBR Framework to enhance their MD&A narrative or 
the narrative of their annual reports. §§ 
Companies cite many reasons for not adopting a value-
driver-based approach to business reporting.  One 
reason frequently referenced by companies expresses 
the concern that competitors will use this information 
in competition against the company.  Another is the 
desire to avoid litigation.  Other often-cited barriers 
include: cynicism about how capital markets work; per-
ceived benefits of playing the earnings game; reluctance 
to be held accountable for a broader set of performance 
indicators; concerns about being the first or only one to 
report on a key value driver; and lack of consistent and 
well-defined data classifications for value drivers.  
Some of these justifications are easy to understand in 
the context of competitive markets; others are less con-
vincing.  The concern that competitors will take advan-
tage of non-financial reporting is a legitimate concern.  
Companies should not give away competitive secrets.  
But the concern is typically exaggerated.46  Competitors 
usually already know as much as they need to about 
each other’s strategies and operations; it is the share-
holders who are in the dark.  As demonstrated by 
existing examples, leading companies are overcoming 
§§  Helpful examples of enhanced MD&A narratives are contained in publications such as the annual review of enhanced reporting published by the au-
diting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), which highlights common themes emerging from narrative reporting.  Available at  PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2006 Good Practices in Corporate Reporting (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005). 
 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu has also published a survey, In the Dark II, focused on the kind of information that boards and senior management rely on 
and how companies measure and evaluate non-financial indicators of success.  Available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/dtt_Audit_
IntheDark033007.pdf 
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performance may be particularly important to analyses 
of newer companies with little operating history.  Thus, 
the effect of using a company’s immediate performance 
as an indicator of future prospects may be acute for 
technology-based companies in the Internet age, where 
network effects and the potential for “winner-take-all” 
results put an extraordinarily high premium on achiev-
ing exceptional results early in the life of the company.
ced recommends that companies voluntarily re-
frain from issuing short-term guidance.  Quarterly 
earnings guidance is both symbol and substance of con-
cerns over companies’ lack of strategic focus on long-
term performance.  At present, about half of listed, 
public companies in the United States give quarterly 
guidance about expected earnings.49  The role of such 
guidance is to communicate and establish expectations 
about company performance.  Unfortunately, those 
expectations are focused on partial, short-term results.  
Consequently, the focus of management, investors, and 
analysts is also on partial, short-term results.  And, as 
indicated above, managers are driven to put the goal of 
meeting the guidance above other, longer-term goals.  
In some cases, managers have made decisions, based in 
part on the perceived need to meet quarterly earnings 
expectations, that have had materially adverse effects 
on the company.  In the case of Enron, such decisions 
effectively destroyed the company.
Earnings guidance is not a bad thing per se, but it is an 
example of how the law of unintended consequences 
can cause good ideas to have bad results.  Guidance 
developed in the 1990s as a result of several factors.  
Market demand set the stage, when investors and 
analysts, many of whom were making their own (less 
informed) forecasts of company performance, clamored 
for companies to provide more transparency.  Of par-
ticular importance was passage of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which granted com-
panies protection from liability when making certain 
forward-looking statements.  Thus, companies began to 
offer quarterly guidance on earnings per share, to give a 
summary indicator of performance.
Research studies indicate that quarterly guidance is at 
best a waste of resources and, more likely, a self-fulfill-
ing exercise that attracts short-term traders.  A survey 
of directors rated missed quarterly financial results 
as the least important signal of the need for greater 
involvement.50  Another study, which analyzed 4000 
resistance to change and, we believe, all companies 
should move ahead.  Certainly, it is less threatening for 
well-managed, high-performing companies to report 
more than the required minimum.  Such companies 
gain when investors, research analysts, and other 
market participants better understand their markets, 
operations, and risks, and are better able to value the 
company’s shares.  As those companies set higher stan-
dards of reporting, markets are likely to view compa-
nies that do not voluntarily adhere to higher reporting 
standards as having something to hide.  Thus, market 
pressure is likely to encourage additional reporting to 
overcome perceptions that a company is poorly run or 
poorly situated.  
It would be especially helpful if FASB and the SEC, 
working together, could add their weight in support of 
financial reporting that is more transparent and more 
informative about the long-term value drivers and risks. 
Some changes may be accomplished with only some 
gentle encouragement from authorities.  For example, 
the Chairman of the SEC could lend support and 
encouragement to enhanced business reporting and 
other forms of improved disclosure that shed light on 
long-term sustainability considerations.  Over time, as 
experience with enhanced reporting is gained, the SEC 
might consider making such reporting mandatory to 
level the playing field and provide greater comparability 
of information through standardized nomenclature and 
definitions.   
Curb Quarterly Earnings Guidance 
The practice of providing earnings guidance—manage-
ment’s self-forecast of performance for the subsequent 
quarter—grew out of reforms in the early 1990s which, 
among other things, sought greater transparency and 
permitted companies to make forward-looking state-
ments.47  Certainly, earnings guidance can serve a 
useful purpose, and its goal of transparency is worthy.  
Supporters argue that earnings guidance reduces share 
volatility and boosts valuations, although in principle 
own-company earnings forecasts should not affect 
share prices.
Such forecasts might affect share prices in the short 
term because analysts and shareholders have come to 
view the ability of management to meet its own forecast 
as an indicator of management quality and, ultimately, 
the long-term prospects of the company.48  Short-term 
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large companies between 1997 and 2004, found no 
evidence that guidance affected valuation multiples, 
improved shareholder returns, or reduced share price 
volatility.51  However, it found that the cost of manage-
ment time and other resources devoted to providing 
earnings guidance was significant.  Most significant is 
that as companies start to provide earnings guidance, 
their trading volume increases, and they attract more 
“transient investors.”  The availability of information on 
short-term performance acts as a magnet to those who 
trade based on such considerations.  Separately, the 
pressure associated with quarterly earnings guidance 
has been cited as one of the factors fueling the boom in 
private equity buyouts.52  
To an extent, market pressure to provide earnings guid-
ance may be receding, as many participants already find 
the practice to have more costs than benefits.  In recent 
years, over 200 companies have discontinued earn-
ings guidance, and the percentage of listed companies 
offering guidance has fallen.53  Companies that drop 
quarterly guidance have one fewer reason to manage 
earnings to hit an earnings-per-share target and, thus, 
may be less likely to sacrifice long-term benefits for the 
appearance of current gains.  A membership survey 
taken by the CFA Institute, a prominent organization 
of investment analysts, showed that three-quarters of 
respondents preferred that companies move away from 
quarterly earnings guidance and towards providing 
more information on a company’s long-term prospects.  
A key obstacle to change is the close link between 
short-term performance and incentive pay for company 
managers, fund managers, and analysts.  (The relation-
ship between performance pay and short-term results 
was examined in the previous chapter.)  
The downsides of quarterly earnings guidance, howev-
er, should not dictate that companies end all guidance.  
As discussed above, companies should provide regular 
guidance on long-term performance and sustainability.  
Such guidance should focus on company strategy, value 
drivers, and long-term risks.  Less focus on quarterly 
earnings per share and more focus on long-term vari-
ables would give analysts and investors more useful 
information about a company’s prospects.
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Page 6, and pages 24-25, Roderick M. Hills, with 
which Deborah Bailey, Patrick Gross, Harold 
Williams, and Linda Wilson have asked to be 
associated.
I am pleased to approve the Corporate Governance 
Report but I disagree with two points made in it:
• “[B]oards should consider requiring  . . . [CEO’s] 
to purchase a substantial number of the company’s 
shares over time with their own money (not just 
from compensation awards)”.
• “Directors also should be required to buy and hold 
the company’s shares.”
I see no justification for such blanket requirements.  In 
some circumstances, requiring a newly recruited CEO 
to purchase stock may make sense.  It can demonstrate 
that he believes in the future of the company and is 
not simply looking for a paycheck.  In other cases the 
company may be in distress.  It may seem to the board 
more than sufficient that the newly recruited CEO 
is willing to risk his or her reputation.  When a long-
time employee is promoted to CEO, why should he be 
required to tie up more of his capital?
Also, boards must make allowance for a CEO to sell 
stock from time to time to enjoy the fruits of years 
of labor.  So long as a CEO holds significant equity, 
whether some is bought with personal funds or some is 
sold on occasion should not be determined by fiat.
There is little reasonable justification to require a new 
director to purchase stock from personal funds.  What 
kind of message is sent by a forced purchase?  It shows 
no real confidence in the company, and will preclude 
many people from joining boards.  It is sufficient to 
make a significant part of a director’s compensation in 
the form of equity, and to require that such equity be 
held for so long as the director continues to serve.
Memoranda of Comment, Reservation or Dissent
Page 8, Donald K. Peterson, with which Harold 
Williams and Linda Wilson have asked to be 
associated.
On the fiduciary responsibility of directors.  
Under some corporate pension plans, directors of the 
board or their delegates are fiduciaries of the plan.  As 
fiduciaries of the corporation’s pension plan, direc-
tors have a responsibility to act in the interest of plan 
participants, with the purpose of providing benefits to 
them.  
One of a fiduciary’s responsibilities is to act prudently 
with respect to the assets and liabilities of the plan.  
Because the liabilities of a pension plan are long-term, 
it makes sense for the plan’s assets to be invested for the 
long term, aside from amounts needed to meet current 
and near-term obligations.  By this reasoning, it ap-
pears counterproductive for plan fiduciaries to support 
investment in asset classes that have a speculative or 
short-term focus.  Yet, pension plans have supplied 
capital for some hedge funds and investment funds that 
have contributed to short-termism.  
This report does not specifically make recommenda-
tions to managers of pension funds and others who 
hold shares of corporate stock.  Nevertheless, direc-
tors, who play many roles within the corporate sys-
tem, should be mindful of the inherent inconsistency 
between countering short-termism in deliberations of 
corporate strategy, executive pay, and other matters, 
while contributing to the problem through pension 
fund investments.  
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CED Counterpart Organizations
Close relations exist between the Committee for Economic Development and independent, nonpolitical research 
organizations in other countries. Such counterpart groups are composed of business executives and scholars and 
have objectives similar to those of CED, which they pursue by similarly objective methods. CED cooperates with 
these organizations on research and study projects of common interest to the various countries concerned. This 
program has resulted in a number of joint policy statements involving such international matters as energy, assis-
tance to developing countries, and the reduction of nontariff barriers to trade.
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